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Abstract: It is generally accepted that, in the cognitive sciences, there are both 
computational and mechanistic explanations. We ask how computational 
explanations can integrate into the mechanistic hierarchy. The problem stems from 
the fact that implementation and mechanistic relations have different forms. The 
implementation relation, from the states of an abstract computational system (e.g., 
an automaton) to the physical, implementing states is a homomorphism mapping 
relation. The mechanistic relation, however, is that of part/whole; the explanans in a 
mechanistic explanation are components of the explanandum phenomenon. 
Moreover, each component in one level of mechanism is constituted and explained 
by components of an underlying level of mechanism. Hence, it seems, computational 
variables and functions cannot be mechanistically explained by the medium-
dependent properties that implement them. How then, do the computational and 
implementational properties integrate to create the mechanistic hierarchy? After 
explicating the general problem (section 2), we further demonstrate it through a 
concrete example, of reinforcement learning, in cognitive neuroscience (sections 3 
and 4). We then examine two possible solutions (section 5). On one solution, the 
mechanistic hierarchy embeds at the same levels computational and 
implementational properties. This picture fits with the view that computational 
explanations are mechanism sketches. On the other solution, there are two separate 
hierarchies, one computational and another implementational, which are related by 
the implementation relation. This picture fits with the view that computational 
explanations are functional and autonomous explanations. It is less clear how these 
solutions fit with the view that computational explanations are full-fledged 
mechanistic explanations. Finally, we argue that both pictures are consistent with 
the reinforcement learning example, but that scientific practice does not align with 
the view that computational models are merely mechanistic sketches (section 6).  
1. Introduction 1 
The question of how different explanations in the cognitive sciences relate to each 2 
other is widely debated (Kaplan and Craver, 2011; Piccinini and Craver, 2011; 3 
Piccinini, 2015; Shapiro, 2017). We focus here on the relations between mechanistic 4 
explanations and computational explanations in the neuro-cognitive sciences. 5 
Mechanistic models describe the phenomenon’s underlying mechanism. Often, they 6 
are considered explanatory because they describe a relevant causal structure, 7 
namely, the causal structure that underlies the explanandum. Moreover, there is a 8 
hierarchy of mechanistic explanations - each component in a mechanistic 9 
explanation is itself explained mechanistically. Computational explanations are 10 
similar to mathematical explanations in that they describe phenomena in abstract – 11 
mathematical or formal – terms. Computational explanations, however, are abstract 12 
in a further sense. They arguably describe abstract, “medium-independent”, 13 
features. Thus, in computational explanations both the describing terms and the 14 
described objects/properties are abstract.  15 
Several authors have recently suggested that computational explanations are a 16 
species of mechanistic explanation (Kaplan, 2011; Kaplan and Craver, 2011; Piccinini 17 
and Craver, 2011; Milkowski, 2013; Piccinini, 2015; Boone and Piccinini, 2016; Coelho 18 
Mollo, 2018; Dewhurst, 2018). The focus of most of these accounts is the neuro-19 
cognitive sciences, in which computational models and explanations are central to 20 
the scientific investigation. Though the accounts are different in detail, they all share 21 
the starting point that computational explanations are in some sense abstract, 22 
whereas mechanistic explanations describe causal relations between physical 23 
entities. Each account offers a unique way to bridge the apparent disparity between 24 
computational and mechanistic explanations. 25 
Whether computational models are indeed mechanistic is still under controversy 26 
(Huneman, 2010; Piccinini and Craver, 2011; Weiskopf, 2011; Kaplan, 2011; Kaplan 27 
and Craver, 2011; Lange, 2013; Chirimuuta, 2014, 2018; Bechtel and Shagrir, 2015; 28 
Rathkopf, 2015; Craver, 2016; Shagrir and Bechtel, 2017; Shapiro, 2017; Craver and 29 
Povich, 2017; Egan, 2017). Here we do not focus on this controversy (though our 30 
analysis might have some implications regarding the nature of computation). Our 31 
concern is with the integration of computation – mechanistic or not – within the 32 
hierarchy of mechanistic explanations. The concern arises from the disparity 33 
between the implementation (or realization) relation and the explanans-34 
explanandum relation in mechanistic explanations. The implementation relation 35 
from the states of an abstract computational system (e.g., an automaton) to the 36 
states of its implementing physical system is a homomorphism mapping relation, so 37 
that each distinct computational state is mapped onto a distinct physical state, which 38 
realizes it. The mechanistic relation, however, is that of part/whole. The explanans in 39 
a mechanistic explanation are components of the explanandum phenomenon. 40 
Moreover, each component in one level of mechanism is constituted and explained 41 
by components of another, underlying, level of mechanism. Hence, it seems, 42 
computational states are realized in some physical structures, but they do not stand 43 
in part/whole relations to them and therefore they cannot be mechanistically 44 
explained by the same structures. So, the question is: how do computational states 45 
integrate with implementational states to form the mechanistic hierarchy? 46 
Before turning to address this question, we want to describe the main features of 47 
mechanistic and computational explanations. Mechanistic explanations have three 48 
main features: they are causal, decompositional and hierarchical. They are causal in 49 
that they explain phenomena by describing their underlying mechanism. Consider 50 
the reflex that is responsible for keeping the direction of gaze constant when the 51 
head is rotated horizontally. It is called the horizontal vestibulo-ocular reflex. Its 52 
function is explained by reference to an underlying mechanism whose inputs are the 53 
effects of head movements on the vestibular organ and whose outputs are given to 54 
the ocular muscles. Within the mechanism there are feedforward inhibitory and 55 
excitatory synaptic connections, so that each pre-synaptic neuron causally affects 56 
the post-synaptic neurons through the synaptic connections (Kandel et al., 2013, 57 
chap. 40). Mechanistic explanations are decompositional because the explanandum 58 
phenomenon is explained in terms of its components, their organization and their 59 
activities (functions). In our example the constant gaze when the head is rotated is 60 
explained by appeal to the specific synaptic connections between neurons, as well as 61 
the neurons’ change in firing rate in response to their synaptic inputs. Finally, 62 
mechanistic explanations are hierarchical: each explaining component in one level is 63 
itself the explanandum for another level of mechanism. Accordingly, the release of 64 
neurotransmitter to the synapse by the pre-synaptic neuron, is also explained 65 
mechanistically (see (Piccinini and Craver, 2011)). Our focus here is the third feature 66 
of mechanistic explanations, namely, the mechanistic hierarchy. An important point 67 
about the hierarchy is that each level in the hierarchy is a mechanistic explanation.  68 
Computational explanations are taken to be abstract in that they refer to abstract, 69 
"medium-independent", properties. This claim is fairly uncontroversial.1 What 70 
perhaps is more controversial is the claim that computational explanations refer only 71 
to abstract, formal properties. Some authors argue that computational explanations 72 
also refer to semantic properties, namely to the specific content of the states 73 
(Shagrir, 2006; Sprevak, 2010); others might insist that computational explanations 74 
also refer to some implementational, medium-dependent, properties (Some of the 75 
writings of (Kaplan, 2011, 2017; Dewhurst, 2018) may be interpreted this way). We 76 
will not get into the debate about the nature of physical computation. Our concern is 77 
with the integration of abstract states and properties of computation in the 78 
mechanistic hierarchy2. We take abstract here to mean ‘medium-independent’ in the 79 
sense that they can be implemented in very different physical media (e.g., both in 80 
brains and in computers). We will refer to these states and properties as 81 
computational. But by this we assume in no way that computational states and 82 
processes are only abstract.   83 
 84 
                                                           
1 There are, however, different ways to account for the nature of these “medium-independent” 
properties. Fodor (1975) and Stich (1983) describe them as “syntactic” properties, and Fodor (1994) 
accounts for the latter in terms of high-level physical properties. Haugeland (1981) describes them as 
“formal” (see also (Fodor, 1980)). Piccinini (2015) describes computational properties as 
“mathematical” or “formal”, and others have suggested that, regarding computations, the relevant 
physical properties of the implementing physical systems are only their degrees of freedom (Piccinini 
and Bahar, 2013; Coelho Mollo, 2018).    
2 While it seems straightforward to associate the computational explanations discussed here with 
Marr’s computational level (1982), algorithmic descriptions of a system can also be abstract and 
computational in the meaning we discuss here, as long as they are ‘medium-independent’. These 
algorithmic descriptions are more similar to mechanistic explanations in that they usually decompose 
the explanandum into its parts, while computational level explanations describe ‘what’ function the 
system performs and ‘why’ (Shagrir and Bechtel, 2017). 
2. The computational and implementational hierarchies 85 
Let us turn to the problem of integrating computational states and properties within 86 
the mechanistic hierarchy. As a warm-up, let us look at the way Piccinini describes 87 
this integration. Piccinini (2015), who defends the view that computational 88 
explanations are mechanistic, takes those computational levels to be levels of 89 
mechanism. In a crucial paragraph in his book he says the following:  90 
The mechanistic account flows naturally from these theses. Computing 91 
systems, such as calculators and computers, consist of component parts 92 
(processors, memory units, input devices, and output devices), their function 93 
and organization. Those components also consist of component parts (e.g., 94 
registers and circuits), their function, and their organization. Those, in turn, 95 
consist of primitive computing components (paradigmatically, logic gates), 96 
their functions, and their organization. Primitive computing components can 97 
be further analyzed mechanistically but not computationally (2015, pp. 118–98 
119). 99 
Now, we think that it is uncontroversial that Piccinini describes here levels of 100 
computation that relate to each other in a part/whole relation. As Piccinini depicts it, 101 
computers consist of processors, memory etc., which in turn consist of registers and 102 
circuits, which in turn consist of logic gates (figure 1).  103 
Figure 1 – The computational hierarchy 104 
 105 
However, Piccinini does make a controversial claim, namely that computational 106 
explanations are mechanistic. This claim has been criticized on three main grounds. 107 
Some critics argue that, even if some computational explanations are 108 
decompositional as in the described case, there are other cases in which 109 
computational explanations do not decompose the explananda into components, 110 
but instead refer to general structural or topological properties of the system, and so 111 
are not mechanistic (Huneman, 2010; Rathkopf, 2015; but see Craver, 2016). A 112 
second criticism is that computational explanations do not always aim to reveal 113 
causal structures. Egan (2017) suggests that computational models are explanatory 114 
because they are abstract and normative. Chirimuuta (2014) suggests that some 115 
computational models explain why a computation takes place by appeal to efficient 116 
coding principles, and Shagrir and Bechtel suggest that some computational models 117 
also explain the existence of a computation by appeal to environmental constraints 118 
(Bechtel and Shagrir, 2015; Shagrir and Bechtel, 2017). According to these two 119 
criticisms, computational explanations are not wholly mechanistic, but it still may be 120 
that some computational explanations, which refer to medium-independent 121 
properties, are decompositional, and therefore may be mechanistic. 122 
Other critics argue that, even when computational explanations involve 123 
decomposition, the resulting levels of computation are not levels of mechanisms. 124 
Instead, they argue that these levels are functional; they are part of a functional 125 
analysis which explains the capacity (Fodor, 1968; Cummins, 1983, 2000). These 126 
critics would agree that the levels are decompositional, relating to each other in a 127 
part/whole fashion, which is perfectly consistent with the functional account of 128 
computational explanations. They would also agree that the pertinent computational 129 
properties are "medium-independent", at least in the sense that they refer to 130 
abstract and not to medium-dependent, implementational, properties. The critics 131 
would argue, however, that the divide between the abstract/medium-independent 132 
properties and implementational properties is indicative of the divide between 133 
functional and mechanistic explanations (Weiskopf, 2011; Shapiro, 2017). Because 134 
functional and implementational entities are inherently different, computational and 135 
mechanistic explanations take place in different levels of explanation. Piccinini 136 
(2015) in turn rejects the functional/mechanistic distinction, arguing that functional 137 
explanations are sketches of mechanism (Piccinini and Craver, 2011). Moreover, he 138 
argues that computational explanations are (ideally) both abstract and full-fledged 139 
mechanistic. They are abstract in the sense that they refer to medium-independent 140 
properties. They are mechanistic in the sense that the medium-independent 141 
properties constrain the implementation ((Piccinini, 2015) But see Shapiro (2017) for 142 
criticism).  143 
We put aside the question of whether the computational level – as a level of 144 
abstract, medium-independent, properties – sufficiently constrains implementation 145 
to be considered mechanistic. We want to highlight a different issue that Piccinini 146 
and others do not discuss, namely, the way that computational (medium-147 
independent) and implementational (medium-dependent) properties relate to each 148 
other in the mechanistic hierarchy.  149 
The picture depicted by Piccinini raises two (related) issues. The first pertains to the 150 
primitive computing components. Piccinini says that “primitive computing 151 
components can be further analyzed mechanistically but not computationally”. He 152 
means that we can further analyze the logic gates in terms of non-computational, 153 
medium-dependent properties. The difficulty is that the logic gates are also 154 
implemented in some medium-dependent properties. The inputs and outputs of 155 
logic gates – typically characterized as 1s and 0s – are often implemented in systems 156 
with specific voltages. The implementing physical objects with specific voltages, 157 
however, are not parts of the digits. More generally, implementation is often 158 
characterized as a mapping homomorphism relation from the states of an abstract 159 
computing system (e.g., an automaton) to groups of states of a physical system. For 160 
example, there is a mapping from the digits 0 and 1 to the sets of voltages, 0-5 volts 161 
and 5-10 volts. The sets of voltages, however, are not themselves the mechanism 162 
that constitute the digits. The question raised, then, is about the relations between 163 
the medium-independent properties that analyze computation in the mechanistic 164 
explanation and the medium-dependent properties that implement computation. 165 
The first ones, the analyzing properties, seem to be parts of the digits, whereas the 166 
second ones, the implementing properties, are not. Are these the same properties 167 
and how do they relate to each other?  We expect a part-whole mechanistic analysis, 168 
but we can only find in this stage an implementation-relation and not a part-whole 169 
relation, so how can logic gates be explained mechanistically?  170 
A second issue concerns the non-primitive computing components. The components 171 
of a higher-level computation are analyzed by an underlying computational level. But 172 
they are also implemented in some medium-dependent properties. How are these 173 
underlying properties – the computational and implementational – related? Take the 174 
computational level that consists of “component parts (e.g., registers and circuits), 175 
their function, and their organization”. Let us call it Cn. The components of Cn can be 176 
analyzed, computationally, by the computational components of an underlying 177 
computational level Cn-1 (e.g., logic gates). However, the computational components 178 
of Cn are also implemented in some medium-dependent properties that belong to 179 
some mechanistic level, Pk. But how are Pk and Cn-1 related in the mechanistic 180 
hierarchy? Moreover, Pk itself is part of a hierarchy, P0, P1, P2,… So, there are two 181 
hierarchies, one computational, C1, C2,… and one implementational, P0, P1, P2,… 182 
(figure 2).  183 
 184 
Figure 2 The computational and implementational hierarchies 185 
 186 
Several issues are worthwhile addressing regarding this picture. First, in some cases 187 
computational explanations are not decompositional (Huneman, 2010; Chirimuuta, 188 
2014; Bechtel and Shagrir, 2015; Rathkopf, 2015; Egan, 2017; Shagrir and Bechtel, 189 
2017), and therefore are not hierarchical. Although in such cases we will not find two 190 
or more hierarchies, the question of how the single-level computational explanation 191 
is integrated into the implementational hierarchy persists. 192 
We would also like to note that much of the structure of these two hierarchies and 193 
their relations depends on how one defines ‘a level of explanation’. There is 194 
practically unanimous agreement that in the scientific investigation of cognitive 195 
capacities both the underlying computation and the underlying implementation 196 
should be addressed eventually. The question that is under debate addresses the 197 
relevant details for a complete explanation of a capacity at a specific level. According 198 
to the mechanistic framework, a complete explanation at each level will include all 199 
the causally relevant relations and activities that constitute the explanandum 200 
capacity.  201 
Our question then is how the computational, medium-independent properties and 202 
their implementational, medium-dependent, properties relate to each other in the 203 
scientific explanation.3 Do we really find two hierarchies, one computational and one 204 
implementational, in which each level in each hierarchy is a complete explanation? 205 
And if this is indeed the case, then how do the two hierarchies relate to each other?  206 
3. A hierarchical computational model for reinforcement learning 207 
It could be argued that the two hierarchies we describe in the decomposition of the 208 
computer are the result of a specific man-made design, and that the observations 209 
from a computer cannot be generalized to the cognitive sciences. For this reason, it 210 
                                                           
3  One can also ask how the implementational hierarchy is decomposed. Depending on one’s view of a 
level of explanation, the implementational hierarchy will include different details. It can include 
merely a reference to the physical structures that underlie the computational function. Alternatively, 
this hierarchy can also describe functions executed by these structures, albeit, medium-dependent 
functions. To illustrate, diodes, which are used on occasion to build logic gates in computers, have the 
function of passing electric current in exactly one direction. Description of such functions can be a 
part of the implementational hierarchy, because such functions are not abstract, but instead describe 
medium-dependent processes. In both cases the decomposition of the implementational hierarchy 
will depend on some function, in the first case it is the computational function, and in the second it is 
the medium-dependent function (which may or may not coincide with the computational function). 
is useful to examine the relation between computation and implementation in the 211 
mechanistic hierarchy with the help of an example from neuro-cognitive science. 212 
Reinforcement learning is a behavior in which the subject learns to choose specific 213 
actions according to their consequences, with the goal of maximizing rewards. It is 214 
widely investigated; it has received attention both from computer scientists who 215 
have suggested algorithms for action selection that maximize specific outcomes 216 
(Sutton and Barto, 1998), and from neural and cognitive scientists who have 217 
compared various reinforcement learning models with subjects’ behaviors (Mongillo, 218 
Shteingart and Loewenstein, 2014; Shteingart and Loewenstein, 2014) and searched 219 
for neural correlates of variables from reinforcement learning algorithms (Samejima 220 
et al., 2005; Li and Daw, 2011; Wang, Miura and Uchida, 2013). 221 
Reinforcement learning is a process that requires multiple different computations, 222 
and as such it can be viewed hierarchically. At the highest level, reinforcement 223 
learning is divided into four main processes, each involving its own computations: 224 
recognizing the subject’s state, evaluating potential actions, selecting an action, and 225 
reevaluating the action based on the outcome (Doya, 2008).   226 
Each one of these processes has been discussed in large bodies of literature and can 227 
be further decomposed in various ways. To provide more concrete examples we will 228 
discuss reinforcement learning in the context of a multi-armed bandit task, where 229 
there is only one state in which the subject repeatedly chooses between multiple 230 
actions, each associated with a certain magnitude and probability of reward. We 231 
describe here a simple and widely used algorithm for reinforcement learning, which 232 
is called Q-learning (because the values associated with the actions are called Q-233 
values) (Sutton and Barto, 1998). In a multi-armed bandit task, reinforcement 234 
learning has two main modules (instead of the four we originally mentioned), action 235 
reevaluation and action selection.  236 
Consider the module which is responsible for reevaluating an action after an 237 
outcome. In Q-learning, each Q-value is meant to reflect the expected reward 238 
associated with each action, also called the action-value. In order to learn this 239 
action-value, after each trial a variable called the reward prediction error (RPE) is 240 
computed. The RPE is the difference between the reward that was just received and 241 
the current value of the chosen action: 242 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑖 → 𝑅𝑃𝐸(𝑡) = 𝑅(𝑡) − 𝑉𝑖 (𝑡)   (1) 243 
Where 𝑅(𝑡) is the reward given at time 𝑡, 𝑎𝑖 is action 𝑖 and 𝑉𝑖 (𝑡) is the action-value 244 
of action 𝑖 at time 𝑡. Then, the value of the chosen action is updated by summing the 245 
previous value with a magnitude that is proportional to the RPE. Written formally: 246 
𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑖 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛 → 𝑉𝑖 (𝑡 + 1) = 𝑉𝑖 (𝑡) + 𝛼 ∙ 𝑅𝑃𝐸(𝑡)
𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑖 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛 → 𝑉𝑖 (𝑡 + 1) = 𝑉𝑖 (𝑡)
             (2) 247 
Where 𝛼 is a parameter that indicates the learning rate. The larger 𝛼 is, the more 248 
weight recent trials are given at the expense of previous trials. 249 
If we wish, we can continue this hierarchical computational explanation, by 250 
explaining how the components in eq. (1)-(2) are computed. For example, we can 251 
explain how the learning rate ‘𝛼’ is computed. We can also explain how the reward is 252 
evaluated, or what the initial conditions set for 𝑉𝑖(𝑡 = 0) are.  253 
Consider now the second module, the module that is responsible for selecting 254 
between different actions. The simplest kind of module would just select the action 255 
that has the highest value, according to the computation in eq. (2). However, this 256 
method may never sample actions that initially received lower values, even in cases 257 
where these lower values were underestimates of the true values. Therefore, it is 258 
generally agreed that some form of exploration is required, i.e., actions with lower 259 
values should be chosen with a non-zero probability. A common model that 260 
incorporates exploration into the choice is a ‘softmax’ function where actions with 261 
higher values have a higher probability to be chosen. The ‘softmax’ function is: 262 
𝑃(𝑎𝑖(𝑡)) =
𝑒𝛽𝑉𝑖 (𝑡)
∑ 𝑒𝛽𝑉𝑗 (𝑡)𝑛𝑗=1
     (3) 263 
Where 𝑎𝑖 is action 𝑖, 𝑃(𝑎𝑖(𝑡)) is the probability of choosing action 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑉𝑖 (𝑡) 264 
is the action-value of action 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑛 is the number of possible actions, and 𝛽 is 265 
a parameter that determines the bias of the choice towards the higher valued 266 
actions. The components of this action selection function can also be further 267 
explained. For example, in this equation, the choice is stochastic. We can also 268 
provide a model for this stochasticity. Or we can explain the choice of 𝛽, which may 269 
be a constant, or change throughout learning. Fig. 3 presents a summary of the 270 
hierarchical model we described so far. 271 
Figure 3 The computational hierarchy of the Q-learning model 272 
 273 
Using the two modules described above, in a multi-armed bandit task, in which 274 
subjects choose between several actions repeatedly, it is possible to learn to choose 275 
the action that is associated with the largest expected reward most frequently. 276 
Hence, a popular theory in the cognitive sciences is that people employ a model 277 
similar to Q-learning in various instances of reinforcement learning tasks.  278 
Q-learning is not the only model that has been suggested for reinforcement learning, 279 
it has a few competitors at several different levels. First, some reinforcement 280 
learning algorithms do not compute the values of actions at all. Instead, learning is 281 
done directly on the ‘policy’: the probability of choosing each action. These are 282 
called direct-policy learning algorithms (Mongillo, Shteingart and Loewenstein, 2014; 283 
Shteingart and Loewenstein, 2014). Second, in the Q-learning model the action 284 
selection function (eq. 3) utilizes the same action-values as the action reevaluation 285 
function (eq. 2). However, in some reinforcement learning algorithms, the action 286 
selection function does not employ the action-value estimates of the action 287 
reevaluation function. Instead, the only signal the action-selection function receives 288 
from the action-reevaluation function is the RPE. In these algorithms, these two 289 
modules are also called the ‘actor’ and the ‘critic’, respectively (Sutton and Barto, 290 
1998). A third issue concerns the complexity of Q-learning. It is argued that it is too 291 
simple to explain a wide variety of behaviors and therefore this original model has 292 
been developed into alternative, more complicated models (Botvinick, Niv and Barto, 293 
2009; Botvinick, 2012). Each of these three groups of competing models challenges a 294 
different part of the computational hierarchy of Q-learning. The first group of 295 
models challenges whether there is an action reevaluation function at all, the second 296 
group of models questions the relation between the action selection and the action 297 
reevaluation functions and the third presents alternatives to the structure within 298 
each function. 299 
We believe that the point is clear, the Q-learning model is hierarchical in nature. 300 
Furthermore, all properties discussed in the Q-learning model are medium-301 
independent: they do not necessitate a specific physical structure. In fact, they are 302 
abstract enough that they can be both implemented in computers and, as many 303 
scientists hypothesize, in brains (Schultz, Dayan and Montague, 1997; Doya, 2000, 304 
2008; O’Doherty et al., 2004; Samejima et al., 2005).  305 
4. The computational and implementational hierarchies of reinforcement learning 306 
A great deal of scientific research has been dedicated to the characterization of the 307 
neural correlates of the Q-learning model (Hollerman and Schultz, 1998; Doya, 2000, 308 
2008; Samejima et al., 2005; Ito and Doya, 2009; Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Tai et al., 309 
2012; Wang, Miura and Uchida, 2013). Experimental evidence has implicated the 310 
basal ganglia, a group of several subcortical nuclei, including the striatum, pallidum 311 
and substantia nigra, in decision making, and specifically in the context of 312 
reinforcement learning (Doya, 2000). With regard to the different modules of 313 
reinforcement learning, the coding of state and possible actions in each state has 314 
been attributed to the cortex, the calculation of the expected reward associated 315 
with each action (action reevaluation) has been attributed to the striatum, action 316 
selection has been attributed to the pallidum, etc. In Fig. 4 you can see a scientific 317 
hypothetical model which describes the implementation of the computational 318 
modules in reinforcement learning.  319 
Figure 4. The implementational model for reinforcement learning. Adopted from 320 
(Doya, 2008). Legend is taken from the original paper. 321 
 322 
The attribution of specific computational properties to brain areas corresponds to 323 
their connectivity patterns. On the Q-learning model we expect action-values to play 324 
a part in the action selection function (eq. 3). On our implementational model 325 
striatal neurons represent action-values and pallidal neurons are responsible for 326 
action selection. Indeed, in line with the computational model, we see that striatal 327 
neurons target and causally affect pallidal neurons. Hence, on this description, 328 
abstract computational relations are translated into causal relations between 329 
physical brain areas.4 330 
One can wonder about the model on the right-hand side of Fig. 4. While the model 331 
on the left-hand side clearly describes causal relations between brain areas, the 332 
model on the right-hand side is abstract and is termed functional by (Doya, 2008). 333 
Although its drawing is abstract, this model is committed to specific brain areas, 334 
sometimes describing brain areas without an apparent function (such as the 335 
Thalamus). For this reason, it would be difficult to consider this model a functional 336 
analysis, as described by (Fodor, 1968; Cummins, 1983, 2000). Furthermore, this 337 
                                                           
4 Some may argue that relations between computational components can already be considered 
causal relations. We discuss the possible outcomes of this position in section 5.  
model is committed to specific media, namely, brain areas, and therefore it does not 338 
describe medium-independent properties. For this reason, we consider it an 339 
implementational model. However, for those who believe that computational 340 
models are both complete mechanistic explanations and medium-independent 341 
(Piccinini, 2015), this model, which focuses on the abstract functions of specific brain 342 
areas, may be similar to what they have in mind5.  343 
The components in the implementation described in Fig. 4 can be decomposed 344 
themselves into subparts, which correspond to parts of the computations. For 345 
example, there is experimental evidence that midbrain dopaminergic neurons that 346 
provide input to striatal neurons, encode the reward prediction error (RPE) (eq. 1), 347 
which is a component in the calculation of action-values (eq. 2) (Schultz, Dayan and 348 
Montague, 1997; Hollerman and Schultz, 1998). To provide another example, 349 
neurons in both the ventral and dorsal striatum receive inputs from midbrain 350 
dopamine neurons, which are taken to encode the RPE (note the arrow from the 351 
gray box to the red box in Fig. 4). Therefore, both are taken to play a role in reward 352 
prediction. Experimental findings have suggested that neuronal activity in the 353 
striatum can be divided into two anatomically and functionally separate parts of 354 
reward prediction: the dorsal striatum plays a role in associating stimuli with 355 
responses, corresponding primarily to an ‘actor’ (action selection) module, while the 356 
ventral striatum plays a role in updating the predictions of future rewards expected 357 
in each state, corresponding to a ‘critic’ (action reevaluation) module (O’Doherty et 358 
al., 2004). 359 
We see in this example two distinct hierarchies, one computational and one 360 
implementational. Parts of the computational hierarchy can be seen in Fig. 3. This 361 
hierarchy is abstract, medium-independent and can be discussed without mention of 362 
any brain structures. We can also see an implementational hierarchy, part of it is 363 
depicted in fig. 4, where brain structures are decomposed into functionally and 364 
anatomically individuated components. In some scientific publications we even see 365 
                                                           
5 If this is the case, some issues regarding this view should be resolved. Most importantly, how 
function can remain medium-independent when it is necessary to state the brain structure in which 
they occur (Haimovici, 2013). 
computational and implementational models for decision making (albeit slightly 366 
different models from the Q-learning model) depicted side by side, as in Fig. 5. 367 
Figure 5 Computational and implementational models, side by side. Adopted from 368 
(Botvinick, Niv and Barto, 2009). R(s): reward function; V(s): value function; δ: 369 
reward prediction error; π(s): policy (action-selection function). DA: dopamine; DLS, 370 
dorsolateral striatum; HT+: hypothalamus and other structures; VS, ventral striatum. 371 
 372 
The relation between these two hierarchies is that of implementation, throughout 373 
the scientific literature brain structures are described as ‘implementing’ (Ito and 374 
Doya, 2011), ‘realizing’ (Doya, 2008), ‘representing’ (Samejima et al., 2005) and 375 
‘encoding’ (Schultz, Dayan and Montague, 1997) computational properties. 376 
5. The relation between the computational and implementational hierarchies 377 
We found in our scientific example two hierarchies, like the ones described in Fig. 2. 378 
However, there are still many open questions about these hierarchies, both in 379 
general and in our example. How do these hierarchies relate to each other within the 380 
scientific explanation? How does this relation reflect the explanatory role of the 381 
computational and implementational models? Finally, what role do implementation 382 
relations and part/whole relations play in the explanation of cognitive phenomena?  383 
In this section, we suggest possible answers to these questions and investigate their 384 
merit. We relate these possible answers to the different views about abstractness 385 
and completeness of computational models. We do not aim to support one stance 386 
on this question, but instead wish to examine the consequence of the different 387 
positions about computational models as explanations and start a debate about 388 
these possible solutions. 389 
We can think of two ways to relate computation and implementation to each other 390 
within the mechanistic hierarchy. One is lumping together the implementational and 391 
the abstract properties in each level, namely C1 and P1, C2 and P2 and so on. Figure 392 
6 shows an example of this picture on the decomposition of a computer.  393 
Figure 6 A single combined mechanistic hierarchy. Each level includes both abstract 394 
and implementational properties that are related through implementation. The 395 
implementational properties are denoted by the drawings in the figure, while the 396 
computational properties are denoted by the words and arrows appearing on top of 397 
the implementational properties. 398 
 399 
On this picture we do not really have two separate hierarchies, but only one: The 400 
pertinent computational properties are lumped together with their 401 
implementational properties in the same level(s) of explanation (a similar structure 402 
of explanation is presented in (Harbecke, under review)). This simple solution implies 403 
that computational and implementational properties figure together in the same 404 
explanation and in the same levels of the mechanistic hierarchy. This solution is in 405 
tension with the view that computational explanations are autonomous from 406 
implementation and therefore do not require implementation details to be 407 
complete, but fits quite nicely with the picture on which computational explanations 408 
are sketches of mechanisms (some people, e.g., (Rusanen and Lappi, 2016; Shagrir, 409 
2016) interpret (Kaplan and Craver, 2011; Piccinini and Craver, 2011) as advocates of 410 
this position). On this picture, the computational sketches turn into a full-fledged 411 
mechanistic explanation only when we complement the sketches with the same-412 
level implementational properties. When both kinds of properties are mentioned 413 
then we have a full-fledged mechanistic explanation, hence a level of mechanism. 414 
The mechanistic hierarchy simply embeds within it, a sub-hierarchy of computational 415 
sketches.  416 
We can see two possible upshots of this construal, depending on one’s view of 417 
computational models as sketches. One may consider computational sketches to 418 
simply be partial descriptions of the implementational model and computational 419 
properties to simply be abstract facets of the implementing properties, stripped 420 
away from their medium-dependent aspects. On this formulation, when the 421 
implementing properties are described in an explanation, the computational 422 
properties, which are merely a part of the implementational properties, become 423 
redundant. We are left with an implementational hierarchy, partial descriptions of 424 
which are computational models. On such a view it is clear how there is only one 425 
mechanistic hierarchy – an implementational hierarchy. However, this view 426 
completely dismisses any explanatory value of computational descriptions that goes 427 
above implementational descriptions and some may argue that this is inconsistent 428 
with scientific practice, which often appeals to computational explanations as more 429 
than partial implementational descriptions (Haimovici, 2013). Alternatively, one may 430 
believe that computational sketches can include details and aspects which are not 431 
part of the implementational model. For example, that they address environmental 432 
constraints or efficient coding principles  (Chirimuuta, 2014; Bechtel and Shagrir, 433 
2015; Shagrir and Bechtel, 2017). Therefore, in the complete model both 434 
computational and implementational properties figure together. This view takes 435 
computational descriptions to be more than partial implementational descriptions, 436 
but it brings up the original problem discussed in this paper - how the unique 437 
computational properties relate to the implementational properties in each level of 438 
the hierarchy. 439 
A second option is to keep the two hierarchies apart (figure 7). The two hierarchies 440 
are related through the implementation relation. The computational properties of 441 
C1 are mapped (implemented by) to the implementational properties of P1, the 442 
computational properties of C2 are mapped to the implementational properties of 443 
P2, and so on. While objects by the same name may appear in both hierarchies, such 444 
as CPUs and registers in Fig. 7, the computational hierarchy includes only abstract, 445 
medium-independent properties (e.g., digits in logic gates) and the implementational 446 
hierarchy includes physical, medium-dependent properties (e.g., voltages). Fig. 7 447 
presents a simple case where each computational level is mapped to each 448 
implementational level. In reality there might not be a perfect match between the 449 
hierarchies and computational properties at the same level may be implemented in 450 
implementational properties in different levels. However the structure of the 451 
implementation relation, in all cases in this picture there are two hierarchies and the 452 
computational properties in the computational hierarch are implemented by 453 
implementational properties in the implementational hierarchy. This solution is 454 
more hospitable to the notion that there is multiple realization of cognitive 455 
functions, since the same computational hierarchy can be related to (i.e., 456 
implemented in) different implementational hierarchies. 457 
Figure 7 Two separate hierarchies, one computational and one implementational, 458 
that are related through implementation. Each level in each hierarchy is a complete 459 
explanation of the phenomenon at the higher level. 460 
 461 
This picture fits quite nicely with the functional view of explanation, namely, the idea 462 
that computational explanations are full-fledged functional (yet non-mechanistic) 463 
explanations. According to this functional picture, computational explanations are 464 
distinct and autonomous from mechanistic explanations (Fodor, 1968; Cummins, 465 
1983), which fits with the solution in which the two hierarchies are distinct. 466 
Computational and implementational properties do not figure together in the 467 
decompositional explanation of the same capacities. Instead, only computational 468 
properties are part of the decomposition of computations. Implementational 469 
properties can still figure in explanations of computations, but these explanations 470 
will not be mechanistic because there is no part/whole relation between explanans 471 
and explanandum. While on this picture the two hierarchies are separate, they still 472 
constrain each other: the relevant implementational properties are determined 473 
according to the computational function, and the computational hierarchy must be 474 
one which can be implemented in the physical system. Despite these mutual 475 
constraints, those supporting this picture will argue that the computation performed 476 
as part of some cognitive capacity can be given a complete explanation at one level 477 
without any reference to implementation and that the implementation details 478 
explain a different aspect of this capacity, namely, how the capacity is implemented. 479 
That is, computational and implementational explanations answer different 480 
questions. 481 
On both pictures, primitive computing processes are analyzed mechanistically, if at 482 
all, only indirectly. The primitive computational components, e.g., logic gates, are 483 
implemented in some implementational properties, e.g., voltages, whereas only the 484 
latter can be further analyzed mechanistically. On the combined-hierarchy picture 485 
(Fig. 6), the computational properties will figure together with implementational 486 
properties in each level, until at some point the primitive computing processes can 487 
no longer be decomposed, and only implementational properties will continue to be 488 
decomposed in the hierarchy. On the separate-hierarchies picture (Fig. 7), the 489 
computational hierarchy will terminate at the primitive computing components. 490 
On both pictures, the implementation is not a part/whole relation and therefore the 491 
description of implementation cannot be taken as a mechanistic explanation. 492 
Nonetheless, these two pictures do differ in how they view the role of 493 
implementation in explanation in general. On the combined picture, both 494 
computational and implementational details figure together in one mechanistic 495 
hierarchy. Therefore, it is natural to take relations of implementation to not have an 496 
explanatory role. Instead, medium-dependent details are taken to explain by 497 
decomposition of the phenomena. On the separate-hierarchies picture 498 
implementation can be considered to have a non-mechanistic explanatory role: it 499 
explains how the explanandum, as well as the computational hierarchy are 500 
implemented (see (Coelho Mollo, 2018)). 501 
What about the view that computational explanations are both abstract and full-502 
fledged mechanistic explanations? It would be difficult to see how the first solution 503 
in Fig. 6 can be consistent with it; if computational explanations are complete 504 
mechanistic explanations why do they require additional implementation details in 505 
the same mechanistic level of explanation? The second solution in Fig. 7 is not 506 
necessarily inconsistent with this view. For example, if one takes computational 507 
states and properties to have causal powers, then one can view the computational 508 
hierarchy as a hierarchy of complete mechanistic explanations. However, on this 509 
view the role of the implementational hierarchy still needs to be explicated. A 510 
possible implication is that the overall mechanistic picture is more complex: We have 511 
different mechanistic hierarchies that apply to different properties of the same 512 
objects/components. But under this picture any computational capacity has at least 513 
two hierarchical explanations, and it is not obvious which one of them should be 514 
considered the mechanistic explanation. A possible way to elucidate this complex 515 
picture is to maintain that the implementational hierarchy explains how the 516 
computational hierarchy is implemented, rather than how the cognitive capacity is 517 
performed (Coelho Mollo, 2018). On this view, the computational hierarchy is the 518 
mechanistic hierarchy which decomposes the cognitive capacity and the 519 
implementational hierarchy is an appendix which explain the implementation of the 520 
computation. 521 
6. Some insights from reinforcement learning 522 
It can be useful to examine the relation between the hierarchies in reinforcement 523 
learning. When considering the computational and implementational hierarchical 524 
models for reinforcement learning, which solution best describes the relation 525 
between these hierarchies? We believe that evidence in this case is mixed and can 526 
support both suggested solutions for the relation between the hierarchies. On the 527 
picture seen on Fig. 6, each level combines computation and implementation into 528 
one mechanistic explanation. Therefore, we would expect the scientific investigation 529 
of lower levels to include a physical decomposition of the higher level, as occurs in 530 
mechanistic explanations. However, in our example the scientific investigation of the 531 
implementation of the computational hierarchy searches for the implementation of 532 
variables at various levels of this hierarchy, such as the representations of action-533 
value (Samejima et al., 2005), RPE (Schultz, Dayan and Montague, 1997) and learning 534 
rate (α in eq. 1) (Behrens et al., 2007). Often, the search for a lower-level variable 535 
such as the learning rate takes place in the absence of a scientifically supported 536 
neural correlate for the higher level computational variable of which it consists (In 537 
this case the calculation of action-value). Hence, the search for neural correlates 538 
here is more akin to searching for relations between two separate computational 539 
and implementational hierarchies than to physically decomposing mechanisms.   540 
Moreover, scientific investigation of both hierarchies can and has been conducted 541 
separately. The Q-learning algorithm for reinforcement learning has been 542 
investigated both analytically (Watkins and Dayan, 1992) and behaviorally 543 
(Shteingart, Neiman and Loewenstein, 2013). These methods ignore the neural 544 
correlates of this model. Similarly, the basal ganglia have been investigated 545 
anatomically and functionally without addressing computational models for 546 
reinforcement learning (Hoshi et al., 2005). This suggests that a framework of two 547 
hierarchies, as presented in Fig. 7, is the appropriate one in this case. 548 
On the other hand, it can be argued that current scientific research is still preliminary 549 
and not indicative of the final form of a fully-fledged scientific explanation. Hints that 550 
such a form will include one combined mechanistic hierarchy can be found in the 551 
fact that scientific debates today about the plausibility of specific computational 552 
models of reinforcement learning often also appeal to the plausibility of the 553 
implementation of these models (Botvinick, Niv and Barto, 2009).  554 
Moreover, findings of implementation of specific computational variables can be 555 
used to support or refute abstract computational models. Recall the three challenges 556 
to the computational model we presented in the section 3. The first one suggested 557 
that instead of learning the values of the actions, there is ‘direct-policy’ learning 558 
where the probability of choosing each action (i.e., the policy) is reevaluated at each 559 
step. However, the finding that striatal neurons represent the expected reward 560 
associated with each action (Samejima et al., 2005) can be taken as support for the 561 
hypothesis that a Q-learning model is implemented in the brain, rather than a 562 
‘direct-policy’ model6.  563 
The finding in (O’Doherty et al., 2004) that striatal neurons can be divided into 564 
‘actor’ and ‘critic’ modules  can be used as evidence in the second challenge: 565 
whether the action selection and action reevaluation modules can be separated into 566 
‘actor’ and ‘critic’. It is also increasingly popular to suggest computational models 567 
that are informed by the structure of neural networks, with the purpose of 568 
suggesting models that are more biologically plausible (Mnih et al., 2016). Note that, 569 
even though physical structures are used as evidence in this debate, the questions 570 
pertain to the architecture of the abstract computational model, which can be 571 
implemented both in computers and in brains.  572 
Given these examples it can be argued that the practice of developing a complete 573 
explanation at each level of the explanatory hierarchy involves a close and reciprocal 574 
relation between the computational models and their possible implementation, and 575 
that computational models are not considered explanations until they have been 576 
shown to be implemented in the brain. This suggests that computation and 577 
implementation belong together in one level of the explanation. Therefore, the 578 
pictures presented in Figs. 6-7 are both still possible regarding this example. 579 
However, when considering whether computational descriptions are merely 580 
sketches of mechanisms, on the interpretation of sketches as partial descriptions of 581 
implementation, the evidence is more conclusive. We see that, in our example of 582 
reinforcement learning, evidence from scientific practice is strongly against the view 583 
of computational models as sketches. Moreover, scientific practice tends to take 584 
implementational details to explain the implementation of the computational model 585 
rather than the cognitive capacity directly. Often, when findings of neural correlates 586 
of reinforcement learning models are reported, they are reported as discoveries 587 
about the implementation of these models. Hence, such findings are taken to 588 
answer questions about how, and whether a specific computational model is 589 
implemented in the brain and they do not attempt to explain reinforcement learning 590 
                                                           
6 But see (Elber-Dorozko and Loewenstein, 2018) 
(or decision making in general) without appeal to some computational model. 591 
Perhaps the strongest indication for this is in experiments where there is some 592 
causal intervention on brain areas and behavioral changes are measured. If 593 
computational models are merely partial descriptions of implementation, they will 594 
be unnecessary in the interpretation of causal experiments, where the causal 595 
structure is already described in the results of the experiment. However, often, 596 
results in such experiments are interpreted in the framework of a computational 597 
model of reinforcement learning (Tai et al., 2012; Wang, Miura and Uchida, 2013; 598 
Lee et al., 2015). For example, (Tai et al., 2012) find that stimulation of striatal 599 
neurons causes a bias in choices, and they interpret these results by saying that 600 
stimulation of striatal neurons mimics changes in action-value. Hence, instead of 601 
utilizing the causal finding to explain the behavior of the subjects, (Tai et al., 2012) 602 
use their finding as an indication of implementation of action-value – a 603 
computational variable. Such a computational interpretation to causal results is 604 
difficult to explain if computational models are taken to be merely partial 605 
descriptions of causal mechanisms and is much more in line with the view that 606 
computational models have a unique explanatory value. Moreover, this scientific 607 
practice can be taken to support the claim that implementational details are taken to 608 
explain the computational model rather than the cognitive capacity itself. 609 
For this reason, we believe that our example does not support the view that 610 
computational models are partial descriptions or that computational models are 611 
explanatory only because they describe causal relations. Instead, this reinforcement 612 
learning example is more consistent with the view that computational properties 613 
play an invaluable role in the explanation of cognitive phenomena.  614 
Nonetheless, reinforcement learning is just one example of computational models of 615 
cognitive capacities. Future investigation of other computational models will be 616 
telling regarding the relation between computation and implementation. 617 
7 Conclusions 618 
After raising the problem of how computational explanations integrate in the 619 
mechanistic hierarchy, we analyzed reinforcement learning as an example of a 620 
computational model in neuroscience and reviewed two possible pictures of the 621 
relations between computation and implementation in the mechanistic hierarchy. 622 
On the one-hierarchy picture computational and their implementational properties 623 
reside in the same level(s) of explanation. On the two-hierarchy picture 624 
computational and implementational properties reside in different computational 625 
and implementational hierarchies. We concluded that both pictures are possible 626 
regarding the reinforcement learning example, but that scientific practice does not 627 
align with the view that computational models are merely mechanistic sketches.  628 
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